PARTY COHERENCE ON ROLL CALL VOTES IN
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

by

Gary W. Cox
Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92037

*This research was supported by the NSF under grant SES-8811022.
ABSTRACT

Previous literature on roll call voting in the House of Representatives has largely found two things: first, there have been fewer and fewer party votes -- i.e., votes in which a majority of Republicans oppose a majority of Democrats -- relative to all votes; second, intra-party cohesion on party votes has declined. We argue that these two measures of the importance of party voting have an insufficiently clear connection to the activity of parties as organizations. Accordingly, we propose alternative measures based explicitly on the activity of each party's floor leader and whip. Using these alternative measures, we find a somewhat different pattern of evidence for the majority party in the post-New Deal era, particularly for votes on revenue and spending bills. We do not examine the earlier part of the century but believe that our measure would corroborate the major finding in the previous literature -- viz., a substantial decline in party strength after the downfall of Cannon.
I. INTRODUCTION

Students of legislatures, particularly in the U.S., have long argued that the institutions can and should be studied by analyzing the observable behavior of legislators -- in particular, recorded votes. Indeed, roll call voting is one of the most intensely studied congressional activities (for recent surveys, see Collie 1984; Thompson and Silbey 1984). A recurrent theme in many of these studies has been that members of Congress have become increasingly individualistic in their voting behavior, i.e., that the characteristics of the individual member or his constituency have become increasingly important determinants of members' voting decisions, relative to the impact of party membership. Whereas most studies of roll call voting find that party is the single best predictor of congressional voting behavior (Marwell 1967; Matthews 1960; Truman 1959; Turner 1951; Turner and Schneier 1970), the importance of party voting in Congress is seen to have declined over time (Brady, Cooper and Hurley 1979; Clubb and Traugott 1977; Collie 1988; Collie and Brady 1985; Cooper, Brady and Hurley 1977). The major finding of this recent literature, Collie (1984: 8) summarizes, is "an erratic but overall decline in the levels of both intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict since the turn of the century."

These results on the decline in party voting fit together with other arguments regarding the salience of parties in the U.S. Congress, most importantly the emergence of the conservative coalition, whose rise and eventual decline has, more or less, been coterminous with the decline and (more recently) the resurgence of party voting in Congress. The apparent decline in party voting has been used as evidence of the emergence of nonpartisan or bipartisan coalitions, universalism, and the implantation of a
new "textbook Congress" founded on the principal of maximizing each member's independence of action and ability to intervene in policy decisions.  

Our purpose in this essay is threefold: first, to discuss some recent work dealing with trends in party voting in the 1980s, a period not included in the literature cited above; second, to review and critique the methods used and results found in the literature on the pre-1980 period; and third, to provide a new perspective on historical trends in party voting since the New Deal. The new perspective for which we argue centers on the activity of party leaders rather than party majorities. Parties, we argue, need not be disciplined and coherent on every issue and every vote in order to structure some voting. Indeed, parties need be concerned only with those issues important to the party's reputation; it is on these issues that the leadership will take measures to structure or "whip" votes.  

Thus, for example, instead of focusing on such standard measures as the number of "party votes" -- defined as roll calls in which a majority of

1. A succinct discussion of the "textbook Congress" perspective can be found in Shepsle 1989. The major components of the new textbook Congress that emerged in the literature on Congress in the 1970s, Shepsle argues, are the development of an incumbency advantage, the rise of professional staff and other resources to maintain and increase that advantage, and the decline of congressional norms both supporting cooperation between members and committees and supporting the committee division-of-labor/issue specialization system. The old textbook Congress -- "committee politics" -- which Shepsle argues prevailed during the 1940s and 1950s, rested on three foundations: weak central party organs and a strong seniority system (i.e., "parties at best coordinated legislative activity rather than coerced it"); a set of largely orthogonal committee jurisdictions; and a set of "norms and folkways" that reinforced and rewarded committee activity (Shepsle 1989: 246).  
2. Our argument is grounded in a theory of the electoral connection between voters and individual members of Congress that is informed by the social choice literature of the past three decades, arising out of the work of Kenneth Arrow (1951), much of which has been highly pessimistic about the prospects for democratic theory (see, e.g., Riker 1980, 1981; Fiorina 1977, 1980). We drew fundamentally different conclusions about the "collective responsibility" (Fiorina 1980) of party members than do many of these authors, however. For a general discussion of the electoral connection and the motivation of party leaders, see Cox and McCubbins forthcoming 1992.
Republicans oppose a majority of Democrats — we look at “party leadership votes” — defined as roll calls in which the Republican and Democratic leaderships oppose one another. If one seeks to assess the importance of parties as organizations, we argue, the usual measures are less appropriate foci than are measures of first, the cohesion of each party in support of its leadership on those roll calls for which the leadership takes a clear stand; and second, the number and importance of the roll calls on which the leadership takes a clear stand. When we reexamine the data from this perspective, we find little indication of a secular (i.e., long-term) decline in the importance of party voting cues in the period after the New Deal — at least for the majority party. 3

In section 2, we examine the theory and evidence offered in previous research purporting a decline in party voting, focusing in particular on one exemplar of the “decline” literature, that offered by Cooper, Brady and Hurley. Our reading of that evidence suggests that congressional parties were not markedly less important in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s than they were in the 1930s. We then evaluate the evidence on intra-party cohesion, suggesting that the base over which cohesion is measured is too broad in the previous studies — that the base should be over “whipped” votes only.

We conclude section 2 by suggesting two new measures of party strength: the size of the party’s agenda; and the party’s cohesion in support of its leadership on the party agenda, 4 which we then examine in section 3. We find

3. We use the term “secular” to mean “extending over...a long period of time”, as per Webster’s. The only further connotation we attach is that of steadiness: we think of secular trends as those which take a long time to unravel and which, during the period of unraveling, are more or less continuously in evidence. Thus, secular trends should be quite amenable to ordinary least squares regression.
4. See the appendix for definitions of party agenda, party agenda vote, and party leadership vote.
little evidence of a secular decline in party cohesion; however, we do find that the Republican party agenda has shrunk mildly over time and the Democratic party agenda took a dip in the 89th through 95th Congresses. In section 4, rather than examining globally the size of the party agendas, and party cohesion overall, we look instead at these two measures for a particular issue area -- fiscal policy. We find that for this important issue area there has been no decline in either measure. Section 5 concludes; the appendix includes a glossary of terms to which the reader can refer for definitions of the measures we and others have employed.

2. A REEVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF PARTY VOTING

2.1 Some Current Research

Systematic study of historical trends in party voting in Congress first became feasible in the mid-1970s, with the compilation of machine-readable roll call votes by the Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social Research. Soon thereafter, the first entries into the field appeared in print, providing and analyzing long time series of data on party voting (Clubb and Traugott, 1977; Cooper, Brady, and Hurley 1977). Obviously, these works could not cover the later 1970s and 1980s. Most of the subsequent literature also has not looked beyond the 1970s.

The chief exceptions to this characterization are a series of recent papers by David Rohde (1988, 1989, 1990a). Using essentially the same methodology as previous researchers, Rohde has extended the time series to the late 1980s. His findings are important. They show, first, an increase in the

5. See also Schlesinger 1985.
frequency of party votes (as a percentage of all roll calls) from the mid-1970s to 1988; and, second, a strong increase in cohesion on these party votes:

Democratic party unity, which had stabilized at a low point between 70 and 72 percent during the first Nixon term (1969-72), began increasing sharply in the 1980s. The average for the 100th Congress (1987-88) was 88 percent, and to find a Congress in which that level was exceeded one has to go back to the 61st (1909-11) (Rohde 1990a: 6).

The importance of Rohde's findings, for present purposes, is not just in what they show -- a significant increase in party voting in the 1980s -- but also in what they suggest about the causation of previous trends. Rohde notes that most previous researchers gave no indication that they expected the long-term decline in party voting to end, much less reverse itself (although some may of course have had this possibility in mind). In the general literature on party, the view developed that party decline in the legislative arena was linked to party decline in the electoral arena. Both seemed to have a considerable inertia behind them, due to the cumulative and long-term effects of a host of party-weakening forces (starting with the Progressive era reforms and ending with the rise of candidate-centered elections). As Rohde points out, however, "the apparent immutability of partisan decline that was explicit

---

6. Party votes are defined as recorded votes in which a majority of non-abstaining Republicans oppose a majority of non-abstaining Democrats (with pairs counted as non-abstaining).

7. Party unity scores are computed as follows: First, the number of times a member supported his or her party in a party vote is divided by the number of times that member participated in party votes. Second, the average across all members of this party unity score is calculated.
or implicit in earlier research has to be taken as disproved" (Rohde 1990a: 32).

Even if not irreversible, the decline in party voting down to 1980 may nonetheless have been substantial and steady. Was it? To answer this question, we shall consider the evidence in greater detail. We will concentrate in particular on the two variables that have received the most attention in the literature: the relative frequency of party votes, and average levels of party cohesion.

2.2 The Evidence on Party Votes

Consider first the relative frequency of party votes. Cooper, Brady, and Hurley (1977) provide the appropriate figures for the 50th (1886-87) through 90th (1966-67) Congresses. Regressing these figures on time, they find a slope of -.52, indicating that party votes as a percentage of all roll calls fell, on average, by about half a percentage point per Congress. If the time series is extended forward ten Congresses and the same regression is performed for the sixty-sixth through one hundredth Congresses, the result is a slope of -.45, only slightly smaller (and still statistically significant).

---

8. Their frequency is, in the present context, measured relative to the total number of recorded votes.
9. They measure "time" by Congress number, as do we in the regression reported next in the text. Regression analysis concerns the problem of describing and evaluating the relationship between a given dependent variable and a set of independent or explanatory variables. In the case of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of a dependent variable on a single independent variable, it involves finding the equation of a straight line that "best" describes the relationship between the two variables -- say, \( x \) and \( y \), where we are estimating \( y \) as a function of the \( x \)'s -- where "best" is defined as minimizing the sum of the squared differences between the observed \( y \)s and the \( y \)s predicted by the regression line. In this paper, we use regression analysis to investigate trends over time in leadership support scores. For more on regression analysis and the use of statistics in the study of politics, see, e.g., Kennedy 1985; King 1989; Maddala 1977; Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1980.
What do these results mean? The answer depends on what constitutes evidence that parties are important in structuring floor voting. Cooper, Brady, and Hurley (henceforth, CBH) stake out a clear position on this issue, arguing that both intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict must exist before one can say that parties are important. Indeed, they measure the importance of party in structuring floor votes by multiplying intraparty cohesion (measured by Rice’s coefficient) and interparty conflict (measured by party vote percentages). They clearly state that high internal cohesion alone is not evidence of party strength: “in a context of low divisiveness [internal cohesion] does not testify to the strength of party as a determinant of voting” (Cooper, Brady, and Hurley 1977: 35-36).

Given this view of party strength, it follows that the decline in the relative frequency of party votes is straightforward evidence that "party strength" is declining. We do not share CBH’s view of party strength, however, because we do not think that interparty conflict is a necessary condition of party strength.

To see why, consider a hypothetically cohesive majority party that succeeds in passing its program against an opposition so divided (or coopted) that the relative frequency of party votes is very low (Collie 1980b). By CBH’s measure, party strength for the majority party in this example would be low because, although the party’s cohesion is high, the level of interparty conflict (measured by the party vote percentage) is very low. But, is the majority party really not very strong in this situation? It is ex hypothesi

---

10. Rice’s coefficient of cohesion is computed for a single roll call and party by taking the absolute value of the difference between the percentage of a party’s membership voting “aye” in the roll call and the percentage voting “no.” Averages are then computed over a set of roll calls in the usual (unweighted) fashion.
both internally cohesive and successful in passing its program. It is only the minority party that seems unimportant.

The point of this example is not to deny the broader point that CBH may have been pointing to: that party strength is a function both of the frequency with which a party springs into action and of its cohesion, when it does. Indeed, our entire paper is structured around this notion. But, if this is what CBH had in mind, we certainly disagree with their next step: measuring the frequency with which a party acts by the frequency with which it disagrees with the other party. If one were trying to measure how frequently a gang acted as a gang, would one count only the instances in which they fought another gang, or would one also include the cases where they acted against an unorganized opponent or no opponent at all? The CBH measure seems to us better suited to measuring the overall state of the party system than to measuring the strength of individual parties. Here, because we are interested specifically in the latter, we attempt a different tack in measurement. Nonetheless, as will be seen, both of the measures that we suggest below also rely to some extent on interparty conflict as a clue to the existence of party action.

In light of the foregoing discussion, what should one make of the trend in party votes? Recent work by Collie (1988) fills in some more pieces of the puzzle by tracking not just party votes but also two other categories: roll calls on which at least 90 percent of the voting members vote in the same direction, which can be called universal votes; and a residual category of roll calls, those that are neither party votes nor universal votes. At least for the period that Collie studies (1933-80) the decline in party votes as a percentage of all roll calls is not accompanied by a mirroring incline in the residual category of votes. Collie finds that the trend over time in the
residual category is essentially nil. The bulk of the action is in party votes and universal votes, with the latter increasing as the former declines. Thus the relative decrease in party votes reflects not so much the increasing activity of shifting cross-party coalitions as the increasing activity of universal coalitions. The chief question is not, why have moderately sized bipartisan coalitions become more prevalent but, instead, why have nearly unanimous coalitions become more prevalent?

It seems quite possible to answer this question in a way that does not do much damage to one's image of how important parties are in determining floor votes. The increasing frequency of nearly unanimous votes might be explained, for example, in terms of increased incentives to record votes on "motherhood and apple pie" issues or, perhaps, in terms of increased incentives for small minorities to push things to a vote. Neither of these explanations would entail less powerful or important parties.\textsuperscript{11}

Put another way, suppose one excluded the nearly unanimous votes from analysis, as is often done in the computation of internal cohesion. Would there still be any substantial trend? The answer is less clear than when dealing with all roll calls. If one regresses party votes (as a percentage of non-universal votes) on time for the period examined by Collie, there is still a significant negative declivity. The slope is no longer significant, however, if one deletes the seventy-third Congress (1933-34).\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} In the early 1880s in Great Britain, Irish obstructionists forced a huge number of divisions on the issue of Home Rule. Both major English parties opposed these initiatives overwhelmingly, and consequently the party vote percentages for these years are much lower than for either preceding or succeeding years. Yet no one argues that any significant decline in the strength or opposition of the parties occurred.

\textsuperscript{12} The seventy-third is the first Congress in the series and has the second highest party vote percentage in the entire data set. That the regression slope is no longer significant when this Congress is excluded reflects the well-known sensitivity of bivariate OLS regressions to the value of the
decline is far from steady. The average party vote percentages by decade for the 1930s through 1970s are: 73.1, 60.3, 65.5, 62.1, and 57.0. The decline from the 1930s to the 1940s seems relatively large; but not much happens from the 1940s to the 1960s.

How much should one make of the eight to thirteen percentage points that separate the House of the 1930s from that of the succeeding three decades? It should be noted that this decline is not always clearly interpretable as party decline. Suppose, for example, that the Republicans stopped opposing core New Deal programs in the later decades, after their popularity became obvious. Then votes on such programs should have been passed by bipartisan majorities, where previously they had been passed by the Democrats alone. Such a change says that the minority party is throwing in the towel, not that "party" -- the majority party in particular -- is less important in understanding what policy is passed and what is not. On the basis of the party-vote evidence alone, it would be hard to argue that the congressional parties were markedly less important in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s than they were in the 1930s.

2.2 The Evidence on Intra-Party Cohesion

Findings on intraparty cohesion can be divided into two subcategories, depending on whether cohesion is averaged over all roll calls or just over party votes. The first type of evidence (cohesion on all roll calls) is presented by both Cooper, Brady, and Hurley (1977) and Clubb and Traugott (1977). Both find little trend over the periods that they examine (1887-1969 and 1861-1974, respectively). As Clubb and Traugott report, based on an investigation of the longer period: "The average index of cohesion for the dependent variable corresponding to extreme values of the independent variable.
Republicans is effectively uncorrelated with time, while the correlation for the Democrats is "at best only moderately higher" (Clubb and Traugott 1977: 394-95). They conclude:

Taken in total, it appears that declining trends in party voting in the House can best be characterized as involving diminution of differences between the parties [as reflected in the decline in the relative frequency of party votes] rather than generalized and increasing partisan disunity (Clubb and Traugott, 1977: 397).

Nonetheless, the cohesion figures in certain subperiods do show a decline. In particular, Clubb and Traugott report regressions on time for the period from 1897 to 1933 and find large and significantly negative slopes for both parties.

Clubb and Traugott also examine party cohesion just on party votes, rather than on all roll calls. These data corroborate the negative slope for both parties in the 1897-1933 period -- and show a continuing decline in the 1933-74 period. Collie (1988) reports similar results for the period 1933-80: she finds that the average percentage of party members voting with a majority of their party falls from the high eighties in 1933-34 to the low seventies in the ninety-first and ninety-second Congresses, recovering thereafter.

Although the trends in cohesion on party votes are fairly clear, what this tells us about parties is less clear. It is conventional to note that some roll calls concern minor issues on which the parties do not oppose one another. Those who discard universal votes before computing average cohesion are usually attempting to get rid of some of the more obvious of such votes. Moreover, the rationale for looking at cohesion only on party votes is often
the same, the reasoning being that roll calls on which party majorities oppose one another are particularly likely to involve important partisan issues.

Even roll calls on which party majorities oppose one another, however, may not be party votes in the sense that some party leader wished to bring them on, was active in organizing support behind one side or the other, or held out the possibility of punishment or reward to party followers. Yet if one is interested in the strength of parties as organizations, then the attitude of party leaders is crucial.

The point can be made clearer by reference to a distinction made in British politics between "whip" votes and "open" votes. Whip votes are those on which a party's whip organization is active -- and this activity is tantamount to a declaration that the party leadership is united in favor of the position that the whips are urging. Open votes, in contrast, are those on which the party leadership -- hence the whip organization -- is silent. No one would think to measure the strength of the leadership of British parties by the levels of party cohesion on open votes. We think a similar restriction should apply in the United States.

It is true, of course, that the power of party leaders is vastly less in the United States than in the United Kingdom. But that is beside the point. There is a detectable variation both in the degree to which an American party's leadership is united, and in the degree to which they communicate their united intent to their followers. The importance of party leaders as voting cues should be measured by the frequency with which they give a fairly clear cue and the cohesion of their followers when they do.

Following this line of thought, we shall adopt the following definitions: for a given party, the "party agenda" is the set of all roll calls on which its top leadership is active and unified, while a "party agenda
vote" is a roll call in the party agenda. A "party leadership vote" is a roll call on which the top leadership of one party is unified in opposition to the top leadership of the other.\textsuperscript{13}

Cohesion on party leadership votes and on party agenda votes seem more readily interpretable statistics than cohesion on party votes conventionally defined. On party leadership votes, for example, the parties clearly confront one another in a meaningful sense. On party votes as usually defined, however, this is not clear: issues devoid of organized partisan conflict may very well find majorities of the parties opposed, simply because of the like-mindedness of members of the same party. If like-mindedness is of interest, then perhaps such roll calls should be included. But if the issue is the strength of the parties as organizations then one presumably wants to isolate those roll calls on which the organizations are indeed active. The appropriate measures of a party’s strength then are (1) the size of the party’s agenda; and (2) the party’s cohesion in support of its leadership on the party agenda. In the next section, we pursue this approach.

3. PARTY AGENDAS AND PARTY LEADERSHIP VOTES

One might identify roll calls on which the leadership of a given party was active in any of a number of ways. One method would be to include only those roll calls prior to which the party’s whip organization had polled the membership and made clear the leadership’s position. Another method would be

\textsuperscript{13} We give operational definitions of both these terms in the next section. Moreover, because we use so many different terms with the word party in them that nonetheless should be kept straight, we provide a brief glossary in the appendix to which the reader can refer when the distinction between party votes, party agenda votes, and party leadership votes begins to blur.
to include roll calls only on issues that the party leaders had identified
publicly as of concern to them as leaders of the party.

These methods would produce fairly small subsets of votes in most
postwar Congresses that would be reasonably close analogs of the British whip
vote. The problem is that getting information on the relevant actions is
difficult: we simply do not know the issues on which the parties' whip
organizations have been active, except for a few Congresses (Frooman and Ripley
1965); and there is no single forum in which party leaders have announced
their agendas, so that one could be assured of cross-time comparability in
identifying "litmus test" votes or the like.

The method that we have therefore had recourse to in identifying party
agendas relies on more readily observable actions: the voting decisions of
the majority and minority leaders and whips. On each roll call, we have
ascertained how the floor leader and whip for each party voted. If a party's
leader and whip both voted on the same side, then that side was taken to be
the party leadership's position (which, henceforth, we shall also refer to as
the party's position).

The party agenda can then be defined in either of two ways. One way is
to include all roll calls on which the party has a position. In practice,
however, this definition yields party agendas that are probably too large.
Roll calls on which both leader and whip vote on the same side constitute
about 70-75 percent of all roll calls in the typical Congress (at least in the
period 1933-89). Moreover, on many votes both parties' leaders are on the
same side of the issue, indicating that it is not a matter of partisan
division. A second definition of the party agenda -- the one that we shall
use in what follows -- excludes these votes. Thus, the "party agenda" is the set of all roll calls on which the party has a position and on which the other party either takes no position or an opposed position. If both parties have a position and these positions are opposed, then the roll call is considered to be a party leadership vote.

These operational definitions obviously do not perfectly capture our original conceptions of party agendas and party leadership votes. On the one hand, the operational definitions are likely to be too inclusive. The floor leader and whip of a party may both vote on the same side of a roll call without taking any stand or exerting any effort as party leaders. Their votes may both be cast in a purely private capacity. On the other hand, the operational definitions may also be too exclusive on occasion. Illness or unavoidable commitments may prevent a leader from voting, even on an issue to which he and the other top leaders have devoted considerable attention.

Nonetheless, our definitions have the considerable advantage of being systematically implementable for a large number of Congresses. Party floor leaders and whips are both identifiable by the opening decade of the twentieth century. There are several gaps in the lists of Democratic whips in the first three decades of the century, but by the 1930s the lists are complete and the office well established.

We have chosen to begin our analysis with the New Deal, conforming to one of the conventional cutting points in the literature (cf. Clabb and Traugott 1977; Collie 1988). We have data through the one hundredth Congress, but concentrate on that portion of the time series that ends in the ninety-sixth Congress, in order to make our results comparable to earlier studies.

14. This is where we borrow from the approach taken by Cooper, Brady and Hurley, by using interparty disagreement as evidence of what really is a party stand.
Thus, all the regression results reported below refer, unless otherwise noted, to the period from the seventy-third to ninety-sixth Congress. All of the graphs, however, include the data from the ninety-seventh through one hundredth Congresses, so that the interested reader can see what has happened in the 1980s.

3.1 Party Agendas

The first questions to be answered concern the size of party agendas, the levels of support that leaders got on these agendas, and trends in these two variables. The measure of size used is simply the number of roll calls in the party agenda as a percentage of all roll calls. The relevant figures for both parties are presented in Table 1. For the Democrats, the relative size of the party agenda ranges from a low of 23.6 percent of all roll calls to a high of 67.7 percent, with a median of 45.4 percent. The Republican figures are similar but generally lower. Over the period stretching from the seventy-third to ninety-sixth Congresses, regressions on time reveal a decline in the size of the agenda for both parties. However, the decline is statistically discernible from zero only for the Republicans.

[Table 1 about here.]

Support for the party agenda is measured by the percentage of times a legislator voted with his party leaders or paired in their favor on agenda

15. The variability in the relative size of the Democratic party agenda, as measured by the standard deviation, is comparable to that in the party vote percentages for the same years: .117 as compared to .113. The correlation between the two variables is .58. The standard deviation of the size of the Republican party agenda is a bit smaller, at .088, and its correlation with the party vote percentage is a bit larger, at .76.
items (the denominator for the percentage being the total number of agenda roll calls on which the legislator did participate, either voting or pairing). The average of these leadership support scores for each party and Congress is reported graphically in Figures 1 (Democrats) and 2 (Republicans). Regressions on time of these averages show a large (-.66) and significant (t=7.1) decline for the Republicans, and a small (-.09) and insignificant (t=.4) decline for the Democrats.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here.]

These results merit some consideration. Previous investigators have found that cohesion declines significantly for both parties, when averaged over all party votes (see the party unity scores presented in Table 2). Our results show a significant decline only for the Republicans. What explains the difference in conclusions regarding the Democrats?

It is not the use of average support scores rather than average cohesion coefficients. These correlate at a very high level, when averaged over the same roll call base. Indeed, if every legislator votes in every roll call, then the average across legislators of party support scores must equal the average across roll calls of cohesion coefficients.\(^{17}\)

So the difference in results must be traced to the difference in roll calls used: the set of votes on which a party's leadership takes a united

---

16. This measure of party loyalty or leadership support is essentially the same as that used by Mayhew 1966.
17. This point holds, simply as a mathematical identity, if the party support scores used tally the percentage of times a legislator agrees with the majority of his or her party. It holds for the leadership support scores used here only if unified party leadingships are always supported by a majority of their followers. Even if this condition does not always hold, however, if it holds in the vast majority of cases then the claim is approximately true; and, more important, the broader point made in the text is largely valid.
stand (and is not joined by the other party’s leaders) is not coextensive with the set of party votes as conventionally defined. This can be illustrated by considering some figures for the eighty-fourth through eighty-sixth Congresses. There were 255 party votes in these three Congresses, only 177 of which were in the Democratic party agenda. The other 78 (or 31 percent) divide into three classes: (1) 10 votes on which the Democratic leader and whip voted against one another; (2) 36 votes on which either the leader or the whip abstained; and (3) 32 votes on which the Democratic leadership and the Republican leadership agreed. Clearly, there were enough party votes not in the Democratic agenda -- and, for that matter, agenda votes that were not party votes\(^\text{18}\) -- so that cohesion figures calculated over party votes and cohesion figures calculated over party agenda votes need not be the same in any given Congress. This difference opens up the possibility that trends over time in the two measures may differ, and indeed we found that they do: although Democratic cohesion on party votes declined over time, it did not decline on agenda votes.

This difference should probably have been expected. The regional split in the Democratic party between north and south is well known and well represented among party votes (Rohde 1988, 1989, 1990a, 1990b; Poole and Rosenthal 1991). Thus, as the north/south split in the Democratic party worsened over time (with the onset of civil rights), it automatically appeared in the cohesion figures for party votes, producing a decline. But there are two reasons why this split is probably underrepresented on the Democratic party agenda. First, what goes into the agenda is a matter of choice. If the top leaders of the majority party seek to avoid being drubbed on the floor,

\(^{18}\text{ There were fifty-six such votes in the eighty-fourth through eighty-sixth Congresses.} \)
they may choose to abstain on certain issues. But abstention by either leader or whip removes the roll call from the party agenda. Second, on issues that split the Democratic party, the floor leader and whip may themselves have been split. This also would remove the roll call from the party agenda.

The primary effect of the north/south split, therefore, should not have been to lower cohesion on the party agenda, but rather to diminish the size of the party agenda. Assuming that the defeat-avoiding leadership got neither better nor worse over time at anticipating defeats and avoiding them, one would expect no particular trend in cohesion, but a decline in the size of the agenda. Similarly, if the floor leader and whip became neither better nor worse as barometers of splits in the party, then one would again expect a decline in the size of the agenda, but no decline in cohesion.

This is basically what we find: no significant trend in Democratic cohesion but a decline in the size of the agenda. Nonetheless, the decline is not significant, and one might wonder why. If the north/south split was large enough to produce a significant declivity in cohesion on party votes, but cohesion on the party agenda shows no significant trend, does this not suggest that increasingly many party votes must have been excluded from the agenda, which should thus have shrunk significantly? There are two points to consider in this regard.

First, if one looks at the size of the majority party's agenda, rather than at the size of the Democrats' agenda -- which entails substituting the Republican figures for the eightieth and eighty-third Congresses -- one finds a significant decline. Two of the smallest Democratic agendas occur in these Congresses, when the Democrats were in the minority. As both Congresses are in the first half of the period investigated, they tend to flatten the slope of decline. In contrast, two of the largest Republican agendas occur in these
Congresses, so substituting the Republican figures strengthens the downward trend in the size of the majority party's agenda.

Second, the seventy-fourth Congress was an unusual one for the Democrats. Their floor leader, William B. Bankhead, was seriously ill throughout the first session and did not vote at all.\(^{19}\) This poor attendance record translates into the smallest party agenda for the Democrats in the entire period: 23.6 percent. If the seventy-fourth Congress is omitted as an outlier, then the decline is strengthened and becomes significant.

Either or both of the latter two explanations point to an average decline of .73 to 1.09 percentage points per Congress in the size of the majority party's agenda, this decline being statistically discernible from zero. Over the span of about twenty Congresses, this translates into an estimated decline in the percentage of all roll calls that are in the majority party's agenda from the mid sixties in the early 1930s to the mid forties in the late 1970s.\(^{20}\)

3.2 Party Leadership Votes

A set of questions similar to those just asked about party agendas also can be asked for party leadership votes (i.e., for those roll calls in the intersection of the two parties' agendas). How many party leadership votes have there been, relative to all roll calls? How much support from their followers have the top leaders received? How have these two variables changed over time?

\(^{19}\) See *New York Times*, December 22, 1935.
\(^{20}\) As can be seen in Table 1, the majority party's agenda grew substantially in the 1980s, reaching 63.5 percent in the one hundredth Congress.
Taking first the question of how many party leadership votes there have been, one can see in the last column of Table 1 that such votes have declined significantly as a percentage of all roll calls. This decline was to be expected given that (1) the size of both parties’ agendas declined and (2) the set of all party leadership votes is the intersection of the two party agendas.

One might at this point ask which set -- the set of party agenda votes or the set of party leadership votes -- is a better approximation of our original conceptual variable of "votes on which the party leaders are active and united". The answer, we think, is that neither is fully satisfactory, with one too inclusive and the other too exclusive. The set of party agenda votes is too inclusive because it excludes only votes on which the top leaders were either obviously inactive (in the sense that one or both did not vote) or clearly disunited (in the sense that they voted against one another). Thus, party agenda votes are simply those in which the party leaders pass a weak test of activity and unity: they are active and united enough to give a consistent voting cue. While the set of all votes on which the top leaders give a consistent voting cue, and the level of support they get when they do, are interesting questions in their own right, they do not tally precisely to those we set out to answer. Indeed, the party agenda vote may be hard to interpret as a measure of party activity for reasons similar to those we used to criticize party votes: there is too high a chance that the party leaders are not really active as such, but only involved in a private capacity.

One can be more sure that the party leaders were acting as such on party leadership votes, because one has the extra clue of interparty conflict. But using interparty conflict as a clue to party activity runs a risk: the relative frequency of votes in which the two party leaderships oppose one
another seems a good measure of interparty conflict, but it is problematic as a measure of the activity of a single party. To confine the analysis to just these roll calls, and use party opposition as a defining condition of party activity, ignores the possibility of roll calls on which one party alone is active.

Thus, there is a tradeoff in using these two measures. Our own view is that the "real" party agenda lies somewhere between the two operational versions on offer. Since both operational measures show a decline, we can be fairly confident that the "real" party agenda declined as well.

Turning now to the second question, average levels of support for the leadership on party leadership votes decline for both parties (as can be seen in Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4). The decline for the Republicans, however, is much larger and much steadier. The decline for the Democrats, although statistically discernible from zero, needs to be hedged about by caveats similar to those we noted above when discussing the size of the party agenda. First, if one excludes the seventy-fourth Congress (in which the Democrat's floor leader was absent unusually often), then the decline in average leadership support scores is no longer statistically significant for the Democrats. Second, if one looks at the figures for the majority party -- which entails substituting the Republican averages for the Democratic averages in the eightieth and eighty-third Congresses -- then, again, there is no statistically significant decline.

[Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 about here.]

Moreover, if one looks at the plot of average leadership support scores for the Democrats over time (Figure 3), one sees virtually no trend over the
period from the seventy-third to eighty-eighth Congresses (confirmed by a regression slope of .003 for this period), followed by: a sharp decline in the eighty-ninth and ninetieth Congresses; fluctuations in the ninety-first through ninety-fifth Congresses; and a large, monotonic increase thereafter. The story one would tell to go along with this pattern is not one of secular party decline.

Rather, it would seem that when civil rights and the Great Society came to dominate the Democratic agenda, southern Democrats abruptly became more disloyal to the leadership. This conjecture is confirmed by Figure 5, which plots separately the average leadership support scores for northern and southern Democrats. As can be seen, there is essentially no trend over time in the loyalty of northern Democrats. The drop-off in the overall figures in the eighty-ninth through ninety-fifth Congresses is produced primarily by the large drop in southern loyalty. Similarly, the marked recovery in overall loyalty in the late 1970s and 1980s is primarily due to the return of southern loyalty to pre-civil rights levels.

[Figure 5 about here.]

Table 2 also presents party unity scores for both parties, in order to facilitate comparison between our figures and those used in the previous literature. The correlation between our loyalty scores and the party unity scores in the last two columns is quite high for the Republicans (.95), somewhat lower for the Democrats (.77). The primary differences between the Democratic trend depicted by the loyalty scores and that depicted by the party unity scores are as follows: the trend in party unity scores over the period from the seventy-third to eighty-eighth Congresses is slightly downward (-.20)
and approaching significance at the .10 level (t=1.4); the decline thereafter continues into the ninety-first Congress and is somewhat steeper; there is little in the way of fluctuation in the period from the ninety-first through ninety-fifth Congresses; and the recovery thereafter is not monotonic, although it is basically the same in size and timing. Our interpretation of events -- wherein there is little trend in party cohesion until civil rights hits the national agenda -- is not supported by the party unity data as much as by the loyalty score data; but it is nonetheless possible to argue a similar position with these data (cf. Rohde 1988, 1989, 1990a, 1990b).

4. ROBUSTNESS OF OUR RESULTS: PARTY ACTIVITY AND COHESION ON REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE VOTES

A natural question to ask regarding our results is whether they would differ were we to look at different issue areas, such as defense, social welfare, and so on. We have not investigated the full range of issues but can report here on one important issue area encompassing the raising and spending of money. Since who pays for what and who gets what are questions central to partisan politics, we expect that there should be even less indication of a decline in party activity and cohesion when attention is confined to such matters.

This expectation is borne out by the data that we can marshall here. Using Rohde's detailed classification of roll calls for the 83rd through 96th Congresses (Rohde 1990b), we identified all roll calls pertaining to taxes, appropriations, and budget resolutions. For this subset of roll calls, we repeated the analyses conducted above for all roll calls.

21. This corresponds to all roll calls in the 100's, 200's, and 500-509 in Rohde's classification.
The results show no statistically significant decline in any of our measures; that is, the relative frequencies of party agenda votes and party leadership votes (within the subset of budgetary roll calls) do not decline, nor do average leadership support scores on (budgetary) party agenda votes or party leadership votes. This of course contrasts with the findings presented above for all roll calls, which showed that most of these measures did decline significantly. Part of the explanation for this contrast is that the analyses reported in previous sections all pertained to the period from the 73rd to the 96th Congresses, whereas the analysis of budgetary roll calls pertains only to the 83rd to 96th Congresses. If one repeats the previous analyses for the shorter time period, one finds that the results are weaker for all roll calls as well. Nonetheless, there is still a significant decline in the relative frequency of both Republican party agenda votes and party leadership votes, when looking at all roll calls. So there is some difference attributable to the issue domain as well. In particular, it looks as if the Republicans kept up a steadier presence on matters budgetary than they did on the entire range of issues. The decline in their overall agenda must be due to decreased leadership activity on other issues.

5. CONCLUSION

Previous research has suggested that there has been a downward trend in partisan behavior in Congress throughout most of the twentieth century (1910-80). This body of work argues that there have been relatively fewer and fewer party votes (votes in which a majority of Republicans oppose a majority of Democrats) over time. At the same time, it also argues that intraparty cohesion on party votes has declined. Political scientists widely have
inferred from these findings that there was a secular decline in the
importance of party throughout most of the 20th century.

We have reexamined these two measures of the importance of party voting,
arguing that they lack a sufficiently clear connection to the activity of
parties as organizations. "Party votes" are counted even when the two
parties' leaders have neither taken a stand nor otherwise acted to structure
the outcome of the vote. The frequency with which party majorities oppose one
another on such votes, and the internal cohesion of parties on such votes, are
surely more important questions in the United States than in Britain. But
these questions fail to get at the strength or importance of the party
organizations in the United States any more than they would in Britain.

Another feature of the party vote percentage that we have emphasized
here is that it is not well-suited to measuring the activity of individual
parties, because it requires both parties to be active. This criticism can be
leveled at any measure that identifies party activity with interparty conflict
(such as our "party leadership vote percentage"). For example, a hypothetical
majority party that was active (and perfectly cohesive) on every roll call,
but faced an opposition that never opposed it, would be judged inactive by
both the party vote and the party leadership vote percentages.

We have argued that the appropriate way to measure the importance of a
party organization in structuring the vote is to first identify votes on which
the top leadership of the party is active and united (the analog of "whip"
votes in the United Kingdom) and then answer two questions: How many such
votes (collectively referred to as the party agenda) are there, relative to
all votes? How cohesive is the party on such votes? The first question gets
at how often leaders take a stand, and the second at whether they are
supported when they do.
The method we have used to identify votes on which a given party's leaders are "active and united" begins by verifying whether or not the party's floor leader and whip both voted on the same side of the issue at stake. This gives a very weak operational sense to "active and united"; it merely excludes those votes on which the top leaders were either inactive (in the sense that one or both did not vote) or clearly disunited (in the sense that they voted against one another). The result is to divide the set of all roll calls into two groups: those in which there is some indication that the leaders are inactive or disunited, and those in which they are at least active and united enough to give a consistent voting cue. We then use interparty conflict as a further clue, excluding those votes on which the leaders of both parties were in agreement. Finally, we ask how many votes there were in which a party's floor leader and whip gave a consistent cue (not offered by the other party's leaders), and what the level of support they received was, when they did.

Following this procedure, we find that the roll call evidence does not suggest a secular decline for both parties in the post-New Deal era. The decline for the Republicans can accurately be characterized in this way: both the size of their party agenda and their cohesion on this agenda diminished considerably, and fairly steadily, from FDR to Reagan. But the story is different for the Democrats. Their party agenda does shrink (growing again in the 1980s), but there is no evidence of a long-term erosion of party cohesion on the party agenda. Rather, there is a sharp dip in the eighty-ninth through ninety-fifth Congresses, produced mainly by the reaction of southern Democrats to civil rights and the Vietnam War, with a substantial recovery thereafter.

Measures that depend on the actions of both parties -- such as the widely-used party vote percentage -- tend to hide the difference between the Republican and Democratic experiences. It is important to note, however, that
the evidence for secular decline is substantially weaker for the majority than for the minority party.

A final way to underscore this point is to look directly at the majority party leadership’s "batting average" -- the percentage of all party leadership votes that it wins. In the seventy-third through seventy-ninth Congresses (1933-46), the majority party leadership won, on average, 75 percent of the time; in the eightieth through eighty-eighth (1947-64), 77 percent of the time; in the eighty-ninth through ninety-fifth (1965-78), 74 percent of the time; and in the ninety-sixth through one hundredth (1979-88), 81 percent of the time. There is little support for any notion of secular decline in the strength of the majority party in these figures.

---

22. These figures were obtained as follows. First, within each period, the total number of party leadership votes was counted, excluding votes that pertained to suspension of the rules or to attempts to override a Presidential veto. These votes were excluded because they involved a two-thirds rather than a simple majority vote. Second, within each period, the number of leadership opposition votes, not involving suspensions or veto overrides, that the majority party won was counted. Third, this latter number was divided by the former to yield the majority party leadership's batting average on "ordinary" votes -- those not requiring a two-thirds vote to pass. The cut points were chosen to correspond to the periods "through the war", "early post-war textbook Congress", "Civil Rights transition", and "the 1980s".
## APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>party vote</td>
<td>A roll call in which a majority of non-abstaining Republicans oppose a majority of non-abstaining Democrats (with pairs counted as non-abstaining).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party agenda vote</td>
<td>A roll call in which both the floor leader and the whip of a party vote on the same side and in which it is not the case that the floor leader and whip of the other party also vote on this side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party agenda</td>
<td>The set of all party agenda votes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party leadership vote</td>
<td>A roll call in the intersection of the two parties' agendas; in which the floor leader and whip of one party oppose the floor leader and whip of the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universal vote</td>
<td>A roll call in which over 90 percent of non-abstaining members vote on the same side.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Total No. of Roll Call Votes</th>
<th>Democratic Party Agenda as % of All Roll Calls</th>
<th>Republican Party Agenda as % of All Roll Calls</th>
<th>Party Leadership Votes as % of All Roll Calls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>1276</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**

(1) First session only.

(2) The Democratic Party Agenda is defined as the set of all recorded votes on which (a) both the Democratic Floor Leader and the Democratic Chief Whip voted on the same side; and (b) it was not the case that both the Republican Leader and whip agreed with the Democratic leaders. The Republican Party Agenda is defined similarly.

(3) The set of Party Leadership Votes consists of all recorded votes such that the Democratic Floor Leader and Whip oppose the Republican Floor Leader and Whip. It is the intersection of the two party agendas, as defined in note (2).
FIGURE 1

AVERAGE LEADERSHIP SUPPORT SCORES ON THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AGENDA,
73RD - 100TH CONGRESSES

Trend Line for 73rd-100th Congresses
Trend Line for 73rd-96th Congresses

Congress
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>1933-34</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>85.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>1937-38</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>1939-40</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>1941-42</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>1943-44</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>1945-46</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>1979-80</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The party unity scores are from Cooper, Brady and Hurley 1977, p. 138 (for the 73rd to 90th Congresses) and Rohde 1990, Table 1 (for the 91st to 100th Congresses).
FIGURE 2

AVERAGE LEADERSHIP SUPPORT SCORES ON THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AGENDA,
73RD - 100TH CONGRESSES

Trend Line for 73rd-100th Congresses
Trend Line for 73rd-96th Congresses
FIGURE 3

AVERAGE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP SUPPORT SCORES ON PARTY LEADERSHIP VOTES,
73RD - 100TH CONGRESSES

Trend Line for 73rd-100th Congresses
Trend Line for 73rd-96th Congresses
FIGURE 5

AVERAGE LEADERSHIP SUPPORT SCORES ON PARTY LEADERSHIP VOTES, FOR NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS, 73RD - 100TH CONGRESSES

Legend: □ = Northern Democrats
        △ = Southern Democrats
FIGURE 4

AVERAGE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP SUPPORT SCORES ON PARTY LEADERSHIP VOTES,
73RD - 100TH CONGRESSES

Trend Lines for 73rd-100th Congresses
Trend Lines for 73rd-96th Congresses

Congress