The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process by D. Roderick Kiewiet; Matthew D. McCubbins: Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House by David W. Rohde
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same causes (or their absence) account for military–industrial relations with the predicted societal effects.

Garbeld is written for a more general audience and would be useful in undergraduate courses, especially if it comes out in a less expensive paperback edition. Both books would do well in graduate courses.

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After more than 40 years of American political scientists' decrying the decline of party in the U.S. Congress, it is heartening to read two books that point to its resurgence and characterize its importance. The book, The Logic of Delegation by D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins and Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House by David W. Rohde, reach similar conclusions about the importance of parties in Congress (and principally the House). This is all the more interesting in that they treat entirely different subjects. On the one hand, the Kiewiet and McCubbins book is concerned with whether Congress has abdicated its role in overseeing the appropriations process. On the other hand, the Rohde book is propelled by the empirical observation that in recent years, partisanship and party leadership have increasingly left a mark on the Congress. Both books conclude that party plays a crucial role for shaping behavior in Congress and for providing oversight over important components of the policy process.

There is a good deal that these books share. They begin from a common perspective that has its foundation in contemporary formal models of political actors. This is somewhat unusual, since those ordinarily identified with the rational choice school have given party short shrift. Parties have usually been viewed as temporary amalgams of interest or conveniences used by representatives to minimize information costs for their constituents. By and large, however, political parties have had little status for this group for trying to understand Congress.

Both books share an affinity for providing party a role that is more than descriptive and holds theoretical content. They share a view that political parties are crucial instruments for holding together otherwise atomistic actors. For some time congressional scholars have noted how members of Congress have become insulated from one another and how this has transformed representatives into independent agents who act on their own agendas. The usual caricature is the incumbent—an individual aloof from partisan concerns, a specialist over a narrow policy range, and a delegate tied to the fancy of constituents. What is absent in such a view, however, is the important role played by party in Congress for binding together a majority of incumbents. Kiewiet, McCubbins, and Rohde recognize that party is crucial and begin to offer a theoretical justification for why party is important.

While the clearest statement of a theory of party comes from Kiewiet and McCubbins, a similar view is implicit in parts of Rohde's book, as well. Political parties within the institution are crucial for solving three key problems. The first involves solving coordination problems. In the absence of parties (or leadership, as Rohde argues), even groups of individuals with similar interests can find themselves working at cross purposes. Parties and leaders serve as a focal point around which members of Congress can easily coordinate. Second, parties are key for solving collective action problems. These problems stem from its being in the interest of each representative to pursue a particular policy end (e.g., obtaining a new grant for mass transportation in the district). Yet if all pursue conflicting private ends, all are left worse off (the budget is broken). The key problem here is how to ensure that all bind themselves to agreements not to raid the Treasury. Parties again provide a useful means for binding individuals to collectively desired goals. Finally, the collective choice problem must be solved for legislatures dominated by independent agents who are bound to highly variable districts. In such instances, vote cycling is an all too real problem. While, in recent years, institutional structure has been viewed as one way in which impermanent and cyclic majorities can be thwarted, the authors here suggest that parties also play a crucial role. Parties are important for minimizing voting cycles on the floor through agenda control, constraints on rules, and binding members together. While such observations may not seem earth-shattering, developing a theoretical basis for party in the Congress is key. Then to use those theoretical insights to inform empirical scholarship is impressive and represents a progressive shift for scholars.

Both books point out that party is far more than a label or descriptive attribute that should be included when studying Congress. Instead, party must be understood from a theoretical basis. Both books provide a useful start for stimulating increased theorizing about the nature of parties in Congress.

Rohde's Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House begins by surveying the large literature decrying the steady decline of partisanship in the House of Representatives. At the same time, Rohde notes that during the 1980s there was an abrupt resurgence of party-based voting. This empirical observation, then, frames the book and raises the important question, "What happened?"

First, Rohde explores the counterintuitive idea that congressional (particularly Democratic) reforms in the 1970s had a delayed effect that contributed to increased partisanship in the 1980s. The standard view of those reforms is that they led to increasing decentralization in the House and further undermined already weakened parties. Through a careful blend of theoretical argument, institutional interpretation, and empirical analysis, Rohde shows how the Democratic Caucus was transformed into a useful coordinating mechanism in the 1980s. This was accomplished not just by institutional fiat but with a decline in sectional divisions.

Second, Rohde demonstrates that these reforms strengthened party leadership, with leaders' granted tools that helped them in structuring the legislative agenda. Yet leadership was not given carte blanche. While leaders could shape the agenda, they were bound as agents to the caucus. The combination of enhancing the ability of leadership to lead and binding leaders to an

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increasingly homogeneous Democratic party contributed to increased partisanship. Rohde is not insensitive to the reaction of Republicans. The 1980s have perhaps best characterized the conflictual nature of divided government, with House Democrats proposing their own agenda to that offered by a Republican President. Rohde is careful to elaborate on the role of Republicans in the House and their response to a more unified majority party. However, the result led to an increasingly frustrated minority cut out of policy formulation. Presidential leadership, he finds, has an interesting effect. While Democrats responded with greater unity in response to Reagan's programs, Carter's own policy agenda tended to fragment the Democratic party.

At the conclusion, Rohde has a very thoughtful, extended discussion of his findings. These are useful in a number of ways. On the one hand, he raises a number of points that question conventional wisdom. In particular, the claim that divided government will inexorably destroy parties does not find much empirical support. On the other hand his speculations give rise to a number of new areas for research. Further exploration of the linkage between electoral responses and the strength of partisanship are certainly in order. So, too, are concern expressed over the nature and strength of leadership. Kiewiet and McCubbins' Logic of Delegation begins by detailing a common view that Congress has abdicated its role of policymaking through delegation. These authors, however, challenge that view, claiming that "it is often the case that desired outcomes can be achieved only by delegating authority to others" (p. 3). The received wisdom and Kiewiet and McCubbins' counterclaim are thoroughly subjected to theoretical and empirical scrutiny. The empirical case they detail is the appropriations process. It is an interesting case, since the opportunities for abdication are manifold: the Appropriations Committee has often been portrayed as an independent watchdog of the Treasury, presidential budget making sets important parameters on the appropriations process, and bureaucrats claim specialized information that limits the questioning of their claims. All are sufficient to undermine Congress from generally playing any positive role in the appropriations process.

Kiewiet and McCubbins make an important distinction between abdication and delegation. It is largely accomplished through a theoretical discussion of principal-agent problems. Central to their argument is that political parties are crucial instruments which constrain their agents. To support their point, the authors then dissect a number of institutions in Congress concerned with the appropriations process. Beginning with the role played by party leadership, they then show the power exerted by the party over the Appropriations Committee and committee assignments more generally. Their empirical work certainly undermines the view that the Appropriations Committee acts as a watchdog of the Treasury and clearly points out that both parties have been successful in pursuing their own policy ends. Likewise, their data generally support the point that appropriations are not taken lightly and that the parties manage to clone likenesses of themselves on that committee. So, with shifts in party fortunes, we can expect Appropriations to reflect those changes.

After detailing why the Appropriations Committee functions more as a delegate of party than as an independent entity, Kiewiet and McCubbins go on to explore how appropriations bills survive scrutiny on the floor. Certainly, members have every incentive to alter appropriations once such bills come to the floor. Allowing this to happen certainly plays into the hands of those who argue that Congress has abdicated its responsibility. However, Kiewiet and McCubbins contend that party control of Appropriations Committee appointments provides an ex post veto over amendments. Their theoretical insights here are very useful, and their empirical examples are quite suggestive. Their conclusion seems quite reasonable: the order of the day is delegation, not abdication, since party holds a firm grasp over the final play of the appropriations game. Even when the budget process is removed from Congress, as with the executive and the Office of Management and Budget's initial proposal, Kiewiet and McCubbins demonstrate that congressional parties exert enormous control over what is churned out of Congress.

The most persuasive part of this book lies in chapter 8, where the authors take a careful look at a number of competing theories to see whether party influence stands up. Using some rather elegant econometric estimations of presidential budget requests and actual appropriations, it is quite clear that congressional parties are key to understanding the appropriations process. While the preceding seven chapters are interesting and suggestive, they never cement the argument. Chapter 8, however, ties together the earlier chapters in a very satisfying way.

All in all, the conclusion from this book is quite simple. Congress has not abdicated its responsibility, as too many scholars have argued. Instead, Congress has chosen to delegate authority in particular ways in order to grapple with the contemporary complexity of the appropriations process. While this system of delegation may look rather weak, it is integrally tied to political parties. Kiewiet and McCubbins' argument and findings deserve careful consideration. While the conclusion may seem simple, as they point out, the implications of their argument and findings are quite general and suggestive.

Both Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House and The Logic of Delegation bear considerable attention from scholars. Both go a long way toward documenting the role of party in Congress. Both rely on important new theoretical considerations about parties in Congress. Both are well-crafted pieces of scholarship. Finally, both will surely pave the way for new research.

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Too few scholars attempt to draw connections between political culture and politics. It is this attempt that makes Knupfer's book worthwhile reading. The central task of this book is to demonstrate the relationship between political culture and political compromise, or to examine the relationship between civic attitude and constitutional development. While most scholars, especially those focused on legislative relations, look at compromise from the stance of political process, Knupfer presents compromise as a political ideology unto itself.