Authored Books


1. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. (with D. Roderick Kiewiet) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Spring 1991.

  • Chapter 2 reprinted in Readings in American Politics: Analysis and Perspective, 1st and 2ndEditions. Edited by Ken Kollman, W. W. Norton & Company, 2009.
2. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. (with Gary W. Cox) Berkeley: University of California Press, Spring 1993.

  • Pages 253-273 reprinted in Classics in Congressional Politics. Edited by Lisa Campoli, Eric Heberlig, and Herb Weisberg. Longman Press, 1999.
3. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (with Arthur Lupia) Cambridge University Press, 1998.

  • Translated to Japanese and reprinted in Bokutakusha Ltd., 2005.
  • Chapter 1 reprinted in An American Government Reader, Pearson Custom Publishing, 2007.
  • Pages 205-227 reprinted in Norton American Politics Online Reader, W. W. Norton & Company, 2008.
  • Excerpted and reprinted in Readings in American Politics: Analysis and Perspective, 1stand 2nd Editions. Edited by Ken Kollman, W. W. Norton & Company, 2009, 2011.
4. Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct Democracy. (with Elisabeth Gerber, Arthur Lupia, and D. Roderick Kiewiet) Prentice-Hall, 2001.
5. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives. (with Gary W. Cox) [ Setting the Agenda Online] Cambridge University Press, 2005.

  • Pages 17–36 Excerpted and reprinted in Readings in American Politics: Analysis and Perspective, 1st and 2nd Editions. Edited by Ken Kollman. W. W. Norton & Company, 2009, 2011.
6. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House Second Edition. (with Gary W. Cox). Cambridge University Press , 2007.

Articles in Journals


1. Policy Components of Arms Competitions. American Journal of Political Science 27, 3 (1983): 385-406.
2. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms. ” (with Thomas Schwartz) American Journal of Political Science 28, 1 (1984): 165-179.

  • Reprinted in Congress: Structure and Policy. Edited by Mathew McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
  • Reprinted in Public Administration: Policy, Politics, and Practice. Edited by William Johnson, Dushkin Publishing Group, 1992.
  • Reprinted in Constitution, Democracy and State Power: The Institutions of Justice. Edited by Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung. London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1996.
  • Reprinted in Economics of Administrative Law. Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman. London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007.
  • Readings in American Politics: Analysis and Perspective, 1st and 2nd Editions. ed. Ken Kollman.  W. W. Norton & Company, 2009, 2011.
3. Policy Choice as an Electoral Investment.” (with Gary W. Cox and Terry Sullivan) Social Choice and Welfare 48, 2 (1986): 370-389.
4. Constituency Influences on Legislative Policy Choice.” (with Terry Sullivan) Quality and Quantity 18, 4 (1984) 299-319.
5. Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection.” (with D. Roderick Kiewiet) Journal of Politics 47, 1 (1985): 59-82. Riddens
6. Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game Between the President and Congress.” (with D. Roderick Kiewiet) Legislative Studies Quarterly 10, 2 (1985): 181-201.
7. The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure.American Journal of Political Science 29, 4 (1985): 721-748.
8. The Politics of Flatland.” (with Thomas Schwartz) Public Choice 46, 1 (1985): 45-60.
9. The Congressional Foundations of Agency Performance.” (with Talbot Page) Public Choice 51, 2 (1986): 173-190.
10. Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game.” (with Gary W. Cox) Journal of Politics 48, 2 (1986): 370-389.
11. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control.” (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 2 (1987) 243-277.

  • Excerpted and reprinted in State and Federal Administrative Law. Edited by Arthur E. Bonfield and Michael Asimow, West Publishing, 1989.
  • Reprinted in Economic Regulation. Edited by Paul Joskow, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2000.
  • Reprinted in Regulation and Regulatory Processes (The International Library of Essays in Law and Society). Edited by Cary Coglianese and Robert Kagan, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007.
  • Reprinted in Economics of Administrative Law. Edited by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007.
  • Reprinted in Rational Choice Politics.  Edited by Torun Dewan, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, London. Sage Publications, 2009.
  • Reprinted in Institutional Law and Economics. Edited by Pablo Spiller, Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.
  • Reprinted in Samuel Kernell and Steven S. Smith, editors. Principles and Practice of American Politics. 2013 Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press: 369.
12. Congress, The Courts and Public Policy: Policy Consequences of the "One Man, One Vote" Rule.” (with Thomas Schwartz) American Journal of Political Science, 32, 2 (1988): 388-415.
13. Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriation Decisions.” (with D. Roderick Kiewiet) American Journal of Political Science 32, 3 (1988): 713-736.
14. Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Virginia Law Review 75, 2 March (1989): 431-482.

  • Reprinted in The Political Economy of Regulation. Edited by Thomas Lylon, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2007.
15. A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion.” (with Randall L. Calvert and Barry R. Weingast) American Journal of Political Science 33, 3 (1989): 588-611.
16. Parties, Committees, and Policymaking in the U.S. Congress: A Comment on the Role of Transaction Costs as Determinants of the Governance Structure of Political Institutions.” (with D. Roderick Kiewiet) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145, 4 (1989): 676-685.
17. Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures.” (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 6 (1990): 307-332.
18. On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress.” (with Gary W. Cox) Legislative Studies Quarterly 16, 4 (1991): 547-570.
19. Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation.” (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Georgetown Law Journal, February 1992.

  • Reprinted in Sutherland on Contracts and Statutory Construction 5th, 6th and 7th Editions, Thompson West Publishing.
20. Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation.” (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) Law and Contemporary Problems 57, 1 (1994): 3-37.

  • Reprinted in Public Choice and Public Law, ed. Daniel A. Farber, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007.
  • Reprinted in Legal Institutions and Economic Development, eds. Robert D. Cooter and Francesco Parisi. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2010.
21. Designing Bureaucratic Accountability.” (with Arthur Lupia), Law and Contemporary Problems 57, 1 (1994): 91-126.

  • Excerpted and reprinted in Gellhorn and Byse's Administrative Law, Cases and Comments, 9th Edition. By Peter L. Strauss, Todd Rakoff, Cynthia R. Farina, Gillian E. Metzger, Foundation Press, 1995.
  • Reprinted in Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Edited by Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
22. Learning From Oversight: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms Reconsidered.” (with Arthur Lupia) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 10, 1 (1994): 96-125.
23. Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House.” (with Gary W. Cox) Legislative Studies Quarterly 19, 2 (1994): 215-231.
24. Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making.” (with Arthur Lupia).” Legislative Studies Quarterly, August 19, 3 (1994): 361-384.

  • Reprinted in Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Edited by Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
25. Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law.” (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) The Southern California Law Review 68 (1995): 1631-1683.
26. Rationality and the Foundations of Positive Political Theory.” (with Michael Thies) Rebaiasan (in Japanese, [Leviathan]) 19 (1996): 7-32.
27. As a Matter of Factions: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan’s LDP.” (with Michael Thies) Legislative Studies Quarterly 22, 3 (1997): 293-329.

  • Reprinted in Japanese Law and Legal Theory: The Political Economy of Japanese Law. Edited by Mark Ramseyer, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 2000.
  • Reprinted in Japanese Law. Edited by Mark Ramseyer, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002.
28. Politics, Institutions, and Outcomes: Electricity Regulation in Argentina and Chile.” (with William Heller) Journal of Policy Reform 1 (1996): 357-387.
29. The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act.” (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15, 1 (1999): 180-217.

  • Excerpted and Reprined in Gellhorn and Byse's Administrative Law, Cases and Comments, 11th Edition. By Peter L. Strauss, Todd Rakoff, Cynthia R. Farina, Gillian E. Metzger, Foundation Press, 2011.
30. Representation or Abdication: How Citizens Use Institutions to Make Their Agents Accountable.” (with Arthur Lupia) European Journal of Political Research 37, 3 (1999): 291-307.
31. Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives.” (with Gary Gox and Mikitaka Masuyama) Japanese Journal of Political Science, Fall 2000.

  • Reprinted in Poliics of Modern Japan: Critical Concepts in the Modern Politics of Asia. Edited by Christopher P. Hood, Routledge, 2008. 
32. Agenda Power in Brazil´s Câmara dos Deputados, 1989 to 1998.” (with Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary W. Cox) World Politics 55, 4 (2003): 550-578.
33. When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement.” (with Elizabeth Gerber and Arthur Lupia) Journal of Politics 66, 1 (2004): 43-68.
34. Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives and Policy Making by Direct Democracy.” (with Thad Kousser) Southern California Law Review 78, 4 (2005): 949-984.
35. Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent.” (with Arthur Lupia) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 14 (2005): 585-617.
36. Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon.” (with Daniel B. Rodriguez) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 14 (2005): 669-715. 
37. Statutory Interpretation and The Intentional(ist) Stance.” (with Cheryl Boudreau and Daniel B. Rodriguez) Loyola Law Review 38 (2006): 2131-2146.
38. The Complex Links Between Governance and Biodiversity.” (with C. Barrett, C. Gibson, and B. Hoffman)  Conservation Biology 20, 5 (2006): 1358-1366.
39. Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980 – 2002.” (published as Mathew D. McCubbin with William Chandler and Gary W. Cox).  German Politics 15, 1 (2006).
40. Courts, Congress and Public Policy, Part I: The FDA, the Courts and the Regulation of Tobacco.” (with Jeff Lax) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 15 (2006): 163-198.
41. Courts, Congress and Public Policy, Part II: The Impact of the Reapportionment Revolution on Urban and Rural Interests.” (with Jeff Lax) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 15 (2006): 199-218.
42. Conditions for Judicial Independence.” (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger Noll and Barry R. Weingast) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 15 (2006): 105-128.
43. When Does Deliberating Improve Decision Making?” (with Daniel B. Rodriguez) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 15 (2006): 9-50.
44. The Dual Path Initiative Framework.” (with Elizabeth Garrett) Southern California Law Review 80, 2 (2007): 299-346.
45. What Statutes Mean: Lessons From Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation.” (with Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia and Daniel B. Rodriguez) San Diego Law Review 44, 4 (2007): 957-992

  • Excerpted and Reprined in Legal Methods, Second Edition. Edited by Peter L. Strauss, Foundation Press, 2008.
  • Excerpted and Reprinted in Strauss, Peter L. 2008. Legal Methods: Understanding and Using Cases and Statutes. Foundation Press.
46. Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies 1988-2000.” (with Gary W. Cox and William B. Heller) Legislative Studies Quarterly 33, 2 (2008): 171-198.
47. When Voters Make Laws: How Direct Democracy is Shaping American Cities.” (with Elizabeth Garrett). Public Works Management and Policy 13, 1 (2008): 39-61.
48. For Whom the TEL Tolls: Can State Tax and Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?” (with Thad Kousser and Ellen Moule) State Politics and Policy Quarterly  8, 4 (2008): 331-361.
49. Nothing But the Truth? Experiments on Adversarial Competition, Expert Testimony, and Decision Making.” (with Cheryl Boudreau) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 5, 4 (2008): 751-789.
50. Knowing When to Trust Others: An ERP Study of Decision-Making After Receiving Information From Unknown People.” (with Cheryl Boudreau and Seana Coulson) Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience 4, 1 (2009): 23-34.
51. The Problem of Being Special: Democratic Values and Special Assessments.” (with Vladimir Kogan) Public Works Management and Policy 14, 1 (2009): 4-36.
52. Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination.” (with Ramamohan Paturi and Nicholas Weller) American Politics Research 37, 5 (2009): 899-920.
53. Competition in the Courtroom: When Does Expert Testimony Improve Juror’s Decisions.” (with Cheryl Boudreau) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6, 4 (2009): 793-817.
54. Proposition 13 and the California Fiscal Shell Game.” (with Colin McCubbins) California Journal of Politics and Policy 2, 2 (2010).
55. The Blind Leading the Blind: Who Gets Polling Information and Does It Improve Decisions?” (with Cheryl Boudreau) Journal of Politics 72, 2: (2010): 1-15.
56. The Rule of Law Unplugged.” (with Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast) Emory Law Journal 59, 6 (2010): 1455-1494.
57. “Party Power or Preferences?: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from American State Legislatures.” (with Gary Cox and Thad Kousser) Journal of Politics 72, 3 (2010): 1–13.
58. “Changing Tracks? The Prospect for California Pension Reform.” (with Vladimir Kogan) California Journal of Politics and Policy 2, 3 (2010) (DOI: 10.2202/1944-4370.1111).
59. Low Memory Distributed Protocols for 2-Coloring.” (with Amos Israeli, Ramamohan Paturi, and Andrea Vattani) Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems, 12th International Symposium 6366 (2010): 303-318.
60. Making Mountains of Debt out of Molehills: The Pro-Cyclical Implications of Tax and Expenditure Limitations.” (with Ellen Moule) National Tax Journal 63, 3 (2010): 603-621.
61. Agenda Control in the Israeli Knesset during Ariel Sharon’s Second Government.” (with Osnat Akirav and Gary W. Cox) Journal of Legislative Studies 16, 4 (2010): 251-267.
62. Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus.” (with Cheryl Boudreau, Daniel B. Rodriguez and Nicholas Weller), Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 7, 4 (2010) 868-885.
63. The Dilemma of Direct Democracy.” (with Craig M. Burnett and Elizabeth Garrett) Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 9, 4 (2010): 305-324.
64. Superstatutory Entrenchment: A Positive and Normative Interrogatory.” (with Daniel Rodriguez) 120 Yale Law Journal Online (2011): 387.
65. Statutory Interpretation: How Much Work Does Language Do? Deriving Interpretive Principles From a Theory of Communication and Lawmaking.” (with Daniel B. Rodriguez) 76 Brooklyn Law Review 979 (2011): 979-996.
66. “Does more connectivity help groups to solve social problems?” (with Daniel Enemark, Ramamohan Paturi, and Nicholas Weller) Proceedings of the ACM Conference of Electronic Commerce (2011). San Jose, CA. 
67. "The Challenge of Flexible Intelligence for Models of Human Behavior." Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health. (with Mark Turner and Nicholas Weller). (2012)
68. “The Mythology of Game Theory.” Proceedings of the International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling & Prediction. Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Eds. Shanchieh Jay Yang, Ariel Greenberg and Mica Endsley. (with Mark Turner and Nicholas Weller). (2012)
69. "The Theory of Minds Within the Theory of Games." Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence. (with Mark Turner and Nicholas Weller). (2012)
70. “Effects of Network Structure on Costly Coordination.” Association for Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Fall Symposium on Social Networks and Social Contagion. (with Nicholas Weller). (2012)
71. "Human Matching Behavior in Social Networks: An Algorithmic Perspective." PLOS One 7(8): e41900. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041900 (with Lorenzo Coviello, Massimo Franceschetti, Ramamohan Paturi, Andrea Vattani). (2012)
72. "Cheap, Easy or Connected: The Conditions for Creating Group Coordination." Southern California Law Review (with Daniel B. Rodriguez and Nicholas Weller). California Law Review, Vol. 86: 495 - 516. (2013)
73. "Gaming Direct Democracy: How Voters’ Views of Job Performance Interact with Elite Endorsements of Ballot Measures." (with Craig M. Burnett). 2013. California Journal of Politics and Policy 5 (4), 627-644 (2013)
74. "When Common Wisdom Is Neither Common nor Wisdom: Exploring Voters' Limited Use of Endorsements on Three Ballot Measures." (with Craig M Burnett). Minnesota Law Review 97 (5): 1557 - 1595. (2013)
75. "Concepts of Law." (with Mark B. Turner). Southern California Law Review. Volume 86, Issue 3: 517-572. (2013)
76. “Testing the Foundations of Quantal Response Equilibrium.” (with Mark Turner and Nicholas Weller). Proceedings of the International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling & Prediction. Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science: 144 - 153. (2013)
77. "Knowledge and Networks: An Experimental Test of How Network Knowledge Affects Coordination." Social Networks. (with Daniel Enemark and Nicholas Weller). Volume 36. January, pages 122–133 (2014)
78. “Sex and the Ballot Box: Perception of Ballot Measures Regarding Same-Sex Marriage and Abortion in California,” (with Craig Burnett). Journal of Public Policy, Volume 34, No. 1 3-33. (2014)
79. "State and Local Government Finance: The New Fiscal Ice Age." (with D. Roderick Kiewiet). Annual Review of Political Science. (2014)
80. “Against Game Theory” (with Gale M. Lucas and Mark B. Turner). In Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences (eds.) Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. (Forthcoming 2015)

Articles in Books


1. “A Theory of Congressional Delegation.” (with Talbot Page) In Congress: Structure and Policy. Edited by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
2. Party Politics, Divided Government, and Budget Deficits.” In The Politics of Economic Policy in The U.S. and Japan. Edited by Samuel Kernell, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991.
3. Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits: Divided Control and Fiscal Stalemate.” In Politics and Economics in the Eighties. Edited by Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, National Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
4. Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits Under Divided Government.” In The Politics of Divided Government. Edited by Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.  
5. Fiscal Policy and Divided Government.” (with Gary W. Cox) In The Politics of Divided Government. Edited by Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
6. “Party Decline and Presidential Campaigns in the Television Age.” In Under the Watchful Eye: Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era.Edited by Mathew D. McCubbins, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992.
7. Party Coherence on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives.” (with Gary W. Cox) In Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System. Edited by Joel H. Silbey, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994.  
8. “Equilibrium Behavior and the Appearance of Power: Legislators, Bureaucrats and the Budget Process in the U.S. and Japan.” (with Gregory Noble) In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. Edited by Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

  • Reprinted in Japanese Law in Context: Readings in Society, The Economy, and Politics. Edited by Curtis J. Milhaupt, J. Mark Ramseyer, and Michael K. Young, New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Reprinted in The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, 2nd Series, edited by J. Mark Ramseyer. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
9. “Perceptions and Realities of Japanese Budgeting.” (with Gregory Noble) In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, edited by Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.
10. Partisan Allocation of the Personal Vote in Japan and the United States.” (with Frances M. Rosenbluth) In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. Edited by Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
11. The Politics of Nuclear Power in Japan and the United States.” (with Linda Cohen and Frances M. Rosenbluth) In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. Edited by Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
12. Putting the State Back into State Government: The Constitution and the Budget.” In Constitutional Reform in California: Making State Government More Effective and Responsive. Edited by Bruce Cain and Roger Noll, Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1995.
13. Legislative Control of Bureaucratic Policy Making.” (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) In New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. Edited by Peter Newman, London: Palgrave-MacMillan, 1998.
14. “Political Structure and Economic Liberalization: Conditions and Cases from the Developing World.” (with William Heller and Phil Keefer) in The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World, edited by Paul Drake and Mathew McCubbins, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
15. “The Institutional Foundations of Political Competence.” (with Arthur Lupia) In Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. Edited by Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

  • Reprinted in Critical Concepts in Political Science, edited by Michael Saward, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2006.
16. “Constructing a Theory of Reasoning.” (with Arthur Lupia and Samuel L. Popkin) In Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality. Edited by Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
17. “Beyond Rationality: Reason and the Study of Politics.” (with Arthur Lupia and Samuel L. Popkin) In Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality Edited by Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
18. “Political Institutions and the Determinants of Public Policy.” (with Stephan Haggard) In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
19. The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes.” (with Gary W. Cox) In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
20. “Political Institutions and Economic Development: The Case of Electric Utility Regulation in Argentina and Chile.” (with William Heller In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
21. Agenda Power in the US House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986.” (with Gary W. Cox) In Party, Process and Political Change in Congress, Volume 1: New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Edited by David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins. Stanford University Press, 2002. 
22. Agenda Power in the US Senate, 1877 to 1986.” (with Andrea Campbell and Gary W. Cox) In Party, Process and Political Change in Congress, Volume 1: New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Edited by David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins. Stanford University Press, 2002.  
23. The Motion to Recommit in the U.S. House of Representatives.” (with Gary W. Cox and Chris Den Hartog) In Party, Process and Political Change in Congress, Volume 1: New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Edited by David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, Stanford University Press, 2006.
24. When Does the Ballot Box Limit the Budget? Politics and Spending Limits in California, Colorado, Utah and Washington.” (with Thad Kousser and Kaj Rozga) In Fiscal Challenges. Edited by Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy and Howell Jackson, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
25. Pathways to Persuasion: How Neuroscience Can Inform the Study and Practice of Law.” (with Cheryl Boudreau and Seana Coulson) In Law and Neuroscience: Current Legal Issues, Volume 13. Edited by Michael Freeman, Oxford University Press, 2011.
26. Going Cognitive: Tools for Rebuilding the Social Sciences.” (with Mark Turner) In Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences. Edited by Ron Sun. MIT Press, 2012.

Book Chapters and Encyclopedia Entries


1. “Introduction: Institutional Aspects of Decision Processes.” (with Terry Sullivan) In Congress: Structure and Policy. Edited by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
2. “Representation.” (with Terry Sullivan) In Congress: Structure and Policy. Edited by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
3. “The Shape of Congressional Institutions.” (with Terry Sullivan) In Congress: Structure and Policy. Edited by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
4. “The Impact of Institutional Arrangements: Implications for the Study of Congress.” (with Terry Sullivan) In Congress: Structure and Policy. Edited by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
5. “The Impact of Institutional Arrangements on the Development of Public Policy.” (with Terry Sullivan) In Congress: Structure and Policy. Edited by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
6. “Introduction.” In Under the Watchful Eye: Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era. Edited by Mathew D. McCubbins. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992.
7. “Conclusion.” In Under the Watchful Eye: Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era. Edited by Mathew D. McCubbins. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992.
8. “Introduction.” In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. Edited by Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
9. “Conclusion.” In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. Edited by Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
10. “The Origins of Liberty.” (with Paul Drake) In The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World. Edited by Paul Drake and Mathew McCubbins, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
11. “Afterword.” In The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World. Edited by Paul Drake and Mathew McCubbins, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
12. Gridlock and the Democratic Tradeoff Between Decisiveness and Resoluteness.” In The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought. Edited by Barry Clarke and Joe Foweraker, Routledge Press, 2000.
13 Legislative Process.” In The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought. Edited by Barry Clarke and Joe Foweraker, Routledge Press, 2000.
14. Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle.” In The Handbook of the New Institutional Economics. Edited by Claude Menard and Mary Shirley, Kluwer Press, 2005.
15. The Political Economy of Law.” (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger Noll and Barry R. Weingast). In The Handbook of Law and Economics. Edited by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Elsevier Press 2007.
16. Delegation to International Agencies.” (with David Lake) In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Edited by Hawkins, Darrin G., David Lake, Daniel Neilson, and Michael J. Tierney.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
17. An Introduction to PPT and the Law.” (with Daniel B. Rodriguez) In The Handbook of Positive Political Economy. Edited by Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, Oxford University Press, 2006.
18. “American Political Geography.” (with David Brady).  In Process, Party and Policy Making: Further New Perspective on the History of Congress, Edited by David Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, Stanford University Press, 2007.
19. “Afterword.” (with David Brady).  In Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress, Edited by David Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, Stanford University Press, 2007.
20. “Managing Plenary Time in Democratic Legislatures: The U.S. Congress in Comparative Context.” (with Gary W. Cox) Chapter 20 in Oxford Handbook of the American Congress. Edited by Eric Schickler and Frances Lee, April 2011
21. Common Agency? Legislatures and Bureaucracies. In Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld and Kaare Strom (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming 2015

Notes, Comments, and Responses

1. Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy.” (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 6 (1990): 203-212.
2. Budget Policy Making and the Appearance of Power.Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations 6 (1990): 133-153.
3. The Theory of Interpretive Canon and Legislative Behavior.” (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) International Law and Economics Review November (1991).
4. Towards a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: A Response to Schickler and Rich.” (with Gary W. Cox) American Journal of Political Science 41, 4 (1997): 1376-1386.
5. Review: A Response to Austen-Smith.” (with Arthur Lupia) Public Choice 106, 1/2 (2001): 183-189.
6. Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma.Regulation 22, 2 (1999).
7. A Précis on Legislative Leadership.” (with Gary Cox) Extensions, Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center, Fall (2003).
8. Theories of Legislative Organization.” (with Gary Cox) American Political Science Association – Comparative Politics Newsletter Winter (2004).
9. What is New in the New Statutory Interpretation? Introduction to The Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues Symposium.” (with Daniel B. Rodriguez) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 14 (2005): 535.
10. Revisiting the Links between Governance and Biodiversity Loss.” (with Christopher Barrett, Clark Gibson and Barak Hoffman) Conservation Biology 21, 4 (2007): 900-901.
11. Administrative Law Agonistes.” (with Barry R. Weingast, Roger Noll and Daniel B. Rodriguez) 108 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 108 (2008): 15-22.

Reports


1. The Fiscal Shape of the American States: Trends and issues in state budgeting in the 21st Century.” (with Ellen Moule) In Governing Arizona, © 2009 the Communications Institute, Los Angeles, CA.

Works in Progress


See my Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Author Page for un-published work and work in progress: Mathew McCubbins SSRN